Private Equity in Brazil: Industry Overview and Regulatory Environment by Guy, Shannon
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
2012 
Private Equity in Brazil: Industry Overview and Regulatory 
Environment 
Shannon Guy 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the 
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shannon Guy, Private Equity in Brazil: Industry Overview and Regulatory Environment, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE 
EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL L. 155 (2012). 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review by 
an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE104.txt unknown Seq: 1  7-DEC-12 13:43
NOTE
PRIVATE EQUITY IN BRAZIL:
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Shannon Guy*
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 R
II. INTRODUCTION TO BRAZIL’S PRIVATE EQUITY
INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 R
III. BRAZIL’S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 R
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 R
I. INTRODUCTION
Brazil is currently one of the most attractive markets in the world for
private equity investments.  In 2010, 36 percent of private equity investors
surveyed by the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association and Coller
Capital claimed that they planned to expand to Brazil in 2011.1 Then, in
2011, Brazil passed China as the single most attractive emerging market
for private equity investments, according to the same survey.2  As Brazil’s
economy matures, its private equity industry has ample room to continue
growing, as evidenced by its relative size in comparison with more mature
markets.  In 2009, private equity and venture capital commitments repre-
sented 2.33 percent of GDP in Brazil, as compared to 3.7 percent of GDP
in the United States and 4.7 percent in the United Kingdom.3  With so
much attention being paid to Brazil’s private equity industry, a description
of the industry’s growth, its key regulators and regulations, and a critical
assessment of regulatory policies are timely.
The overall goal of this note is to paint a picture of the current state of
the private equity industry in Brazil and the existing regulations which
must be obeyed to participate as a private equity investor.  Part II of this
note provides a brief history of the private equity industry in Brazil, dis-
* The author is a third-year law student at the University of Michigan Law School.
The author would like to thank Professor Michael S. Barr, Professor Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Ligia Bernardo, and Arthur Rodrigues for their valuable advice in connection with
this Note.
1. Jason Mitchell, Brazil’s Stellar Returns Attract Global Private Equity Players, INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/2785726/
Brazils-Stellar-Returns-Attract-Global-Private-Equity-Players.html?ArticleId=2785726.
2. See Brazil Overtakes China as Private Equity Favourite, LONDON EVENING
STANDARD (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/business/brazil-overtakes-china-as-
private-equity-favourite-6393270.html.
3. Antonio Gledson De Carvalho et al., Private Equity and Venture Capital in Brazil:
an Analysis of its Recent Evolution 5 (Getulio Vargas Foundation, Working Paper No. G24,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996729.
155
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cusses recent investor interest in the growing area, and introduces the
main regulatory bodies in Brazil.  Part III explains several specific rules
that govern a private equity investment by breaking down the “life” of a
private equity investment into four stages: (1) setting up the private equity
fund, (2) investing in a targeted company, (3) managing the targeted com-
pany, and (4) exiting the investment.  At each of these stages, the focus is
on explaining the general ground rules that a private equity investor must
abide by, with the goal of introducing practitioners to the regulations gov-
erning an investment in Brazil throughout the investment’s life cycle.  In a
complementary note, which will be published in Issue 2 of this Journal, I
will build on this introduction to Brazil’s private equity industry and main
regulators and provide a critical analysis of the underlying policy choices
inherent in Brazil’s regulatory regime, and provide modest suggestions for
future reforms.
II. INTRODUCTION TO BRAZIL’S PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY
This section introduces Brazil’s industry for private equity investments
and summarizes recent investor interest in the country.  The goal of this
section is to familiarize the reader with the size and scope of the industry
and to introduce key macro-economic and regulatory changes adopted by
the Brazilian Government that have allowed it to blossom.  This section
also introduces the key regulators that play a role in setting rules that gov-
ern private equity investments in Brazil.  The substantive regulations that
govern investments are explored in Part III.
A. Growth of the Brazilian Private Equity Industry
The Brazilian private equity industry4 was born amid market-oriented
reforms of the mid-1990s, grew in fits and starts during its first fifteen
years, and has experienced a rapid, explosive expansion in the past ten
years.  The size of the private equity industry in a given country may be
measured by capital commitments, the amount of money passed through a
private equity vehicle and allocated to a company in a private equity trans-
action.  The following graph in Table 1 (made using data compiled by De
Carvalho et al.,5) demonstrates the growth of capital commitments in
Brazil.
4. The private equity investment process entails raising funds from qualified inves-
tors, organizing a private equity investment vehicle to hold those funds, choosing target
(portfolio) companies to receive strategic investments, exercising influence over those com-
panies to make them more valuable, and then selling the original investment for a profit.
Private equity frequently refers to investments made in already existing companies in the
mid-to-later stages of growth.  Venture Capital is a type of private equity investment usually
focused on new, high-growth companies in their early stages.  Accordingly, venture capitalists
may focus on “seed” or “startup” funding, and private equity investors may focus on “mezza-
nine,” or “growth,” funding.  For purposes of this note, these two categories of investment
are discussed together as part of the overall Brazilian private equity industry.
5. De Carvalho et al., supra note 3.
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TABLE 1: BRAZILIAN PRIVATE EQUITY CAPITAL COMMITMENTS
1999-2009 (BILLIONS OF USD)
Before the mid-1990s, there was virtually no private equity industry in
Brazil.  Then, in 1994, the Brazilian Government enacted the Plano Real, a
free-market oriented comprehensive governmental reform aimed at stabi-
lizing the currency and encouraging investment in Brazil.  The reforms im-
posed by the Plano Real were mostly economic, like pegging the Brazilian
real to the dollar, and included measures aimed at capital liberalization
and the privatization of several state-owned companies. These reforms
succeeded in encouraging investment, and Brazil received its first wave of
intrepid private equity investments in the early 1990s.6
Initial international investor enthusiasm for Brazilian private equity
was short-lived.  In 1999, Brazil experienced macroeconomic shocks re-
lated to the Asian and Russian financial crises.  The real was devalued in
1999, which severely affected the performance of dollar-denominated in-
vestments in Brazil.  Due to this economic uncertainty, foreign investors
by and large withdrew their investments from the country by the turn of
the century.7
The period between 1999 and 2004 was a time of gradual growth in the
Brazilian private equity industry.  While most foreign investors had left,
local players continued to make small investments in the tens of millions
of dollars in medium-sized companies.  According to Ocrama, an alterna-
tive investment fund that invests in private equity funds, local players were
able to generate attractive gross returns during this time, averaging 30 per-
cent per year.8  With the rise of these successful local players, the private
equity industry in Brazil slowly expanded.  As demonstrated by the graph
above, commitments grew at 9 percent per year between 1999-2004, from
$3.7 billion to $5.6 billion.  Since 2004, the Brazilian private equity indus-
6. Mitchell, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id. As mentioned in Part III, there is little independent data on the size and scope
of private equity fund deals—unless these deals are disclosed to the public—so information
generally comes from “insiders”.
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try has experienced an explosive growth spurt, which only slowed down
briefly during the recent financial crisis.  Capital commitments spiked be-
tween 2004 and 2009 at a growth rate of nearly 50 percent per year, reach-
ing $36.1 billion by 2009.9  While investment in Brazil slowed during the
recent financial crisis, as demonstrated by a decrease in Brazil-targeted
fundraising, it has since picked back up.10  According to the Emerging
Markets Private Equity Association, Brazil-targeted fundraising reached
$3.6 billion in 2008, dipped down to approximately $0.5 billion in 2009
(alongside a global slowdown associated with the recession), but com-
pletely recovered by 2010, reaching $4.6 billion and surpassing the 2008
high.11  In 2011, Brazil-targeted fundraising had another record-setting
year, reaching $7.1 billion.12  This trend demonstrates that private equity
investors remain interested in raising funds dedicated to investment in
Brazil, and the market will likely continue growing, even in the post-finan-
cial crisis environment.
The number of private equity deals conducted each year, in absolute
numbers, also increased during the relevant time period.  According to a
survey written by Michael Prahl et al. and published by the INSEAD
Global Private Equity Initiative (GPEI) with support from Price-
waterhouseCoopers, the number of private equity deals in Brazil has
steadily increased between 2006 and September 2010, from 63 private eq-
uity deals in 2006 to 243 by September of 2010.13  By 2011, more than 550
Brazilian companies had received venture capital or private equity invest-
ments.14  This data demonstrates that Brazilian investment is not only in-
creasing, but that these investment funds are being dispersed between an
increasing number of different companies, rather than concentrated in the
hands of just a few power players.
The reasons for the explosive growth of Brazil’s private equity industry
since 2004 are diverse, and a detailed discussion of each is beyond the
scope of this note.  Here, I highlight several important macroeconomic
and regulatory factors which help explain the period of rapid growth in
Brazil’s private equity industry.  Most importantly, Brazil’s stabilization of
its inflation rate has been a crucial component for this growth.15  While
Brazil’s interest rate was historically high, since 1996 Brazil has generally
9. De Carvalho et al., supra note 3.
10. See Ernst & Young, Private Equity in Brazil: Ready for its Moment in the Sun
ERNST & YOUNG  6-13 (2010), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Private_Equity_
in_Brazil/$FILE/EY_Private_Equity_in_Brazil.pdf.
11. Mitchell, supra note 1.
12. Full-Year 2011 EM PE Industry Statistics, EMERGING MARKETS PRIVATE EQUITY
ASSOCIATION (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.empea.org/research/data-and-statistics/full-year-
2011-em-pe-industry-statistics.
13. Michael Prahl et al., Brazilian Private Equity: Moving Centre Stage 4 (INSEAD,
Working Paper No. 2011/74/DS, 2011), http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.
cfm?did=48210.
14. Mitchell, supra note 1.
15. De Carvalho et al., supra note 3, at 3.
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kept rates below 10 percent, and closer to 5 percent (with the exception of
a brief spike in inflation in 2003).  Reigning in inflation is important to
private equity investors because it demonstrates macroeconomic stability
and assures them that their money will not depreciate in value due to
macroeconomic factors.
De Carvalho et al. attribute the achievement of a stable inflation rate
to the actual implementation of the reforms introduced in the 1994 Plano
Real, discussed earlier.16  De Carvalho et al. also credit the Brazilian Gov-
ernment with publicly reaffirming its commitment to monetary stability as
key to stabilization of the macro-economy, particularly when investors
feared Brazil might veer left during the early years Lula da Silva’s presi-
dency (2003 and 2004).17  Another important factor in Brazil’s achieve-
ment of relative macroeconomic stability was the country’s achievement of
“investment grade” status in 2008.18  Notably, foreign investments
skyrocketed after this upgrade.
Alongside efforts to curb inflation, improvements in income distribu-
tion and reductions in poverty led a large number of Brazilians to enjoy
increased purchasing power, which likewise increased Brazil’s economic
prosperity and improved its investment environment.19  According to the
GINI index, which measures the distribution of income among individuals
in an economy, Brazil has reduced income inequality over the past several
years.  While Brazil’s GINI co-efficient was 61 in 1990; by 2010, it had
been reduced to 54.7.20
Major regulatory reforms also contributed to the growth of Brazil’s pri-
vate equity industry.  First, in 2003, the Brazilian Government specifically
created a special kind of investment vehicle known as Fundos de Investi-
mento em Participações (“FIPs”), which allowed for special tax incentives
similar to those available under U.S.-style private equity investments and
provided significant incentives for investors to invest in private equity
funds in Brazil.21  The availability of this special type of vehicle facilitated
additional investments in the country and demonstrated the Brazilian
Government’s commitment to encouraging private equity.  Second, Brazil
significantly improved corporate governance by reforming its main domes-
tic stock market, BOVESPA.  BOVESPA created a voluntary listing seg-
ment, the Novo Mercado, “New Market,” which gave companies the
option to list with more stringent corporate governance standards, or
maintain the status quo, and list on other segments.  Companies, by and
large, began to list on the Novo Mercado segment, paving the way for




19. Id. at 5.
20. Gini Index Data, THE WORLD BANK, available at http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SI.POV.GINI
21. See id. at 8.
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insofar as they represent a viable exit opportunity for the private equity
investment.  Third, Brazil’s decision in 2009 to allow pension funds to in-
vest up to 20 percent of fund capital in private equity vehicles allowed
these funds to become an important class of institutional investors, and
provided private equity funds with an influx of available capital to make
investments.
B. Key Regulators in Brazil’s Private Equity Industry
This section introduces the regulatory bodies that set the rules for pri-
vate equity actors in Brazil.  These regulatory bodies include the Brazilian
Government’s Securities and Exchange Commission (Commissao de
Valores Moviliarios), self-regulatory agencies such as the Brazilian Associ-
ation of Financial and Capital Markets Entities (“ANBIMA”), and the
São Paulo Stock Exchange (“BOVESPA”).
The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (“CVM”) is the
main national regulator for private equity funds.  The CVM’s general goal
is to protect capital markets by releasing broad regulations for investment
funds.  The CVM’s regulatory power includes issuing binding instructions
and deliberations that affect private equity; but, notably, this activity is not
the agency’s main focus.  The CVM articulates its mission as such:
To secure the efficient and regular monitoring of the stock exchanges and
over-the-counter markets, protect the holders of securities against the illegal
actions of administrators and controlling shareholders, to attempt to avoid or
restrain the fraud, the creation of unfair market conditions, or price-fixing, to
assure public access to information related to negotiated securities and the
companies that emitted them, to secure the observation of equitable commer-
cial practices in the securities market, to stimulate saving, and to promote the
expansion and efficient functioning of the stock market.22
The key thing to note about the CVM’s mission is that it is primarily
focused on regulating securities and overseeing the stock market.  The
“quotas” that are issued to private equity fund holders are not considered
securities under Brazilian law because they are private placements sold to
qualified investors.23
22. Main Objectives, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N OF BRAZIL, http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/
indexing.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
23. Up until 2001, Brazilian law employed a restrictive concept of what constituted a
security.  Law no. 6,385/76, which created the CVM in 1976, provided a comprehensive list of
“securities” that could be updated only by rule of the National Monetary Council.  “Private
equity investments,” were not on the CVM’s enumerated list of securities, nor were funds
that generally invested in companies that were not publicly traded.  Accordingly, both went
unregulated by the CVM.  By contrast, the quotas of investment funds that invested in public
companies were considered securities, and were regulated by the CVM.  The definition of
security changed in 2001 when Law No. 10,303/01 amended 6,385/76 and established that the
existence of a public offering of equity or debt becomes the determining factor in the qualifi-
cation of a bond or contract as a security.  Under this definition, private equity funds do not
meet the definition of “securities” because they are limited to qualified investors. See
Marcelo Trindade, Strategic Challenges for the Investment Fund Industry 11 (March 5, 2012),
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Even though private equity funds are not considered securities under
the CVM’s primary area of concern they are, nonetheless, folded into the
CVM’s regulatory responsibilities.  CVM Instruction 391/03 regulates the
establishment, functioning, and administration of the most popular form
of private equity fund in Brazil, the FIP.24  Other CVM instructions re-
quire private equity funds that are organized under different legal rules
(such as a holding company) to register with the CVM and to provide
information related to the sorts of investments the fund will make.25  Fur-
ther, the CVM can bring enforcement actions related to investor
protection.
Private equity funds are also subject to regulations imposed by self-
regulated entities if they are members of certain self-regulatory organiza-
tions and when they take their portfolio companies public.  Stock ex-
changes, futures markets, and other above-ground markets are all self-
regulated entities in Brazil which generate rules and regulations that firms
need to follow during the public offering process.  Further, private associa-
tions establish voluntary rules that private equity funds must abide by if
they wish to retain membership in the association.
A prominent example of a self-regulatory organization is ANBIMA
(The Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Markets Entities), a
private association to which many private equity firms belong.  ANBIMA
is a self-described “voluntary, private regulator” but also “the representa-
tive of institutions that act in the financial and capital markets.”26
ANBIMA’s members include more than 340 commercial banks, invest-
ment banks, asset management organizations, broker-dealers, and invest-
ment consultants.27  As “regulator” and “representative” ANBIMA wears
many hats.  The organization produces statistical studies related to capital
markets, seeks to promote transparency by releasing daily indexes related
to price data and attempts to educate the public about investment deci-
sions.  In April 2012, ANBIMA, along with ABVCAP, the Brazilian Asso-
ciation of Private Equity and Venture Capital, released a Code for the
Regulation and Best Practices of Private Equity and Venture Capital
Funds, which contains rules that member private equity funds of
ANBIMA or ABVCAP must follow.28  Notably, this document is gener-
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/public/publ/seminario/PAINEL01/Marcelo%20Trindade%20-%2
0%20ingles.pdf.
24. CVM Instruction No. 391, available at  http://www.cvm.gov.br/asp/cvmwww/atos/
exiato.asp?File=\Inst\inst391.htm
25. BUREAU OF ECON., ENERGY, AND BUS. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 2011 IN-
VESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – BRAZIL (March 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/e/
eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157245.htm.
26. What is ANBIMA, ANBIMA, www.anbima.com.br (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
27. Id.
28. Código ANBIMA de Regulação e Melhores Práticas [Code for the Regulation and
Best Practices], ANBIMA, (Jan. 18, 2012), http://portal.anbima.com.br/fundos-de-investimen
to/regulacao/codigo-de-fundos-de-investimento/Documents/Codigo%20de%20Fundos%20d
e%20Investimento.pdf  [hereinafter Code for the Regulation and Best Practices].
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ated in collaboration with publicly-traded companies to regulate the activi-
ties of entities that act in the financial and capital markets.29  The rules
imposed by ANBIMA’s voluntary code are discussed in Part III infra.
The Brazilian stock exchange, BOVESPA, also generates rules that
may influence private equity activity.  If a private equity investment
culminates in an initial public offering and wishes to list on the São Paulo
Stock Exchange, it will have a choice as to the amount of corporate gov-
ernance it wishes to adopt, and it will be able to choose among three dif-
ferent trading segments.  BOVESPA’s specific regulations are discussed in
Part III.
III. BRAZIL’S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTMENTS
Part II of this note introduced the Brazilian private equity industry and
its main regulators.  This part analyzes the actual regulations that govern
private equity investments in Brazil throughout the life of the investment.
Taking a closer look at the rules, I analyze the life of an investment in four
stages: (1) setting up the private equity vehicle; (2) investing in or acquir-
ing the target company; (3) managing the target company; and, (4) exiting
the private equity investment.  The goal of this part is to focus on the ac-
tual rules that govern private equity investments, and evaluate the Brazil-
ian Government’s regulatory choices by focusing on whether or not each
encourages private equity investment while minimizing risk and arbitrage.
A. Stage One: Choosing a Private Equity Investment Vehicle
A private equity investor’s general goal in setting up a private equity
vehicle is to establish a business entity that allows an investor to invest in
companies in ways that allow the investor to influence the company’s deci-
sions and increase its value in order to sell the investment for a profit
within a certain amount of time (usually at least five years).  The first thing
a private equity investor needs to do to conduct this investment in Brazil is
to establish a private equity fund under Brazilian law and begin collecting
money from investors to place in the fund.  There are several different
private equity investment vehicles available to set up private equity funds
that invest in Brazilian companies.  This section explains which types of
investment may be used, and it describes the trends in fund organizational
choices.  The section also comments on some of the policy issues raised by
the current regulatory regime governing set-up of funds.
To frame the discussion of investment vehicle choice, the pie charts in
Table 2 compare which types of investment vehicles were chosen by pri-
vate equity funds in Brazil during 2004 and 2009.  The charts also compare
the percentage of total committed capital associated with each type of
fund.  These charts were prepared using data published by the Brazilian
Agency for Industrial Development (“ABDI”) in the First and Second
29. Id.
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Censuses of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Brazil.30  ABDI col-
lected the data used in the charts through voluntary surveys.  Nonetheless,
the results are extensive since the 239 investment vehicles that responded
to the survey in 2009 represented of 94 percent of the total number of
investment vehicles in the country and held 97 percent of the total com-
mitted capital in the industry.31  Since the Brazilian Government does not
publish statistics on fund choice, this data appears to be the most compre-
hensive snapshot of institutional choices that is available.  The implications
of the findings of these charts are discussed throughout this section of the
note.
Also crucial to a discussion of investment vehicle setup is information
related to the origin of the funds.  In other words, where does the money
come from?  The following graph in Table 3 from the Getulio Vargas
Foundation demonstrates that in 2008, half of the committed capital in
Brazil’s private equity industry came from funds organized in Brazil, 20
percent came from funds organized in the United States, 16 percent came
from funds organized in other places (including tax havens), 13 percent
came from funds organized in Europe, and just one percent came from
funds organized in other Latin American countries.32  The Getulio Vargas
Foundation is currently collecting data to update this survey.
Even though the majority of funds were organized under the laws of
Brazil, in 2008, a majority of the money came from outside of Brazil.  In
June 2008, foreign investors provided 57 percent of all capital commit-
ments.33  The next largest source of money was Brazilian pension funds,
accounting for 24 percent of total committed capital.34  As discussed later,
Brazil passed important legislation in 2009, which allowed Brazilian pen-
sion funds to invest more money in private equity vehicles.  It is likely that
the next survey of Brazilian private equity will show an increase in the
amount of capital coming from local Brazilian pension funds.
Given these organizational choices, the next part of this note discusses
available investment vehicles, factors contributing to choosing each, and
policy questions related to setup.
1. Limited Partnerships Organized Under the Laws of Another Country
In the United States, most private equity funds are structured as lim-
ited partnerships.  This corporate form provides distinct tax advantages for
30. GVcepe of FGV et al., The Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry: Second




32. GETULIO VARGAS FOUNDATION, OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN PRIVATE EQUITY
AND VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 16 (2008), available at http://gvcepe.com/site/wp-content/
uploads/2008/12/panorama_2008_en.pdf. [hereinafter, OVERVIEW].
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 23.
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U.S. funds.  Notably, the limited partnership form taxes each investor at
his own individual income tax rate, as opposed to the higher corporate tax
rate.35  In Brazil there is no limited partnership investment vehicle availa-
ble; however, Brazil allows funds to organize as limited partnerships over-
seas and then make private equity investments in the Brazilian financial
and capital markets.36  If funds wish to operate in this way, funds must
35. De Carvalho et al., supra note 3, at 7.
36. Id.
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* Includes Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands, and South Africa
OBS: PE/VC organization origin means where it is registered and has its legal headquarters.
register with the Brazilian Central Bank, appoint an attorney-in-fact in
Brazil, and designate a financial institution to take responsibility for the
fund’s investments in the country.37  Frequently, financial institutions
serve as both an advisor related to investments, as well as an attorney-in-
fact.  The attorney-in-fact must enroll at the Brazilian Securities and Ex-
change Commission, apply for a tax ID, and register each investment with
the Central Bank.38
Private equity funds typically choose to organize as a limited partner-
ship overseas when they plan to make a single investment in one Brazilian
company and do not intend to raise capital in Brazil.39  It is common for
these funds to organize under the laws of Delaware, which has expedited
the process of registration and set up.40  Choosing to organize a limited
partnership abroad allows foreign investors to pick and choose their regu-
lator to establish the fund, and does not require these foreign investors to
maintain a physical presence in Brazil (except insofar as they associate
with local institutions).
37. CVM Instruction No. 325, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/cvm_325.
ASP; Central Bank of Brazil Resolution No. 2,689, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/
regu/res2689.asp.
38. Id.
39. Carlos Lobo, Road Map for Private Equity Investments in Brazil, VEIRANO ADVO-
GADOS (Jan. 2012), http://www.veirano.com.br/veirano/Portals/0/Road_map_for_private_-
equity.pdf.
40. Fabio Campos Mello, Brazil: Private Equity Finds a Home, INTL. FIN. L. R. (June
1, 2009), available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2239218/Brazil-Private-equity-finds-a-home.
html
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The above data on preferred investment vehicles in 2004 and 2009, as
demonstrated in Table 2’s pie-charts, shows that in 2004, limited partner-
ships organized under the laws of other countries, but with permission to
operate in Brazil, were the most frequently used type of investment fund.
Investors used this type of vehicle in 30 percent of cases, and such vehicles
received by far the most assets, at 62 percent of total committed capital.
By 2009, the number of limited partnerships remained high, representing
26 percent of total funds and holding 47 percent of total committed capi-
tal, but were second in number to FIPs, which represented 28 percent of
total funds and held 21 percent of total committed capital.  The decrease
in committed capital allocated to limited partnerships is likely due to sig-
nificant tax benefits associated with FIPs (another organizational form dis-
cussed below) and the increased allowance of indirect investment.  The
fact that limited partnerships remain a common choice likely demonstrates
the significant presence of foreign investors interested in making one time,
targeted investments in Brazilian companies without the need to raise cap-
ital in Brazil.
The availability of limited partnerships structured elsewhere may be a
good thing insofar as it opens up Brazilian capital and financial markets to
foreign investors who might prefer to organize under the laws of other
nations.  In this way, it may increase access to money for more Brazilian
companies, promoting innovation and growth, which lead to tangible ef-
fects in the real economy.  On balance, it is possible that the State of Dela-
ware, where many limited partnerships are organized, does a better job
than the Brazilian regulators at overseeing the screening process for quali-
fied investors and setting threshold requirements for the organization of
private equity funds.  This may be due to increased familiarity and special-
ization as a result of the large number of funds that choose to organize in
Delaware.  On the other hand, since Brazil allows limited partnerships or-
ganized under the laws of any country to access the Brazilian financial and
capital markets, if those foreign partnerships follow the procedures de-
scribed above (registering with the Central Bank and appointing an attor-
ney in fact), the current regulation may risk creating a race to the bottom
because Brazil does not inquire about the quality of the home country’s
regulation.  However, since the amount of money involved in private eq-
uity investments is large, investors have the incentive to organize in juris-
dictions that offer them the most protection.  The availability of organizing
a private equity fund as a limited partnership organized under the laws of
another country is an important reason why many private equity investors
are interested in placing their funds in Brazilian private equity invest-
ments.  Due to the fact that many funds organize in Delaware and because
Delaware implements strong oversight into the private equity fund regis-
tration process, use of foreign investment vehicles like these perpetuate
investment in Brazil because they signal to subsequent investors that the
market is populated by stable and non-risky players.
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2. Brazilian Private Equity Funds (“FIPs”)
Fundos de Investimento em Participações, or FIPs, are special invest-
ment vehicles established specifically for Private Equity funds by the Bra-
zilian Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003.41  Like U.S. private
equity funds, FIPs are structured as “closed funds,” which means that in-
vestors cannot redeem their shares at will.42  Investors are locked into the
investment for the full length of the fund’s term (usually 10 years), making
investments in FIPs highly illiquid.43
To set up a private equity fund as a FIP the fund manager must register
with three Brazilian institutions.  First, the FIP must register its “incorpo-
ration acts” at the Registry of Titles and Deeds (Cartório De Registro De
Tı́tulos e Documentos) in the city where the FIP will have its home of-
fice.44  In the “incorporation acts,” the fund’s administrator must provide
at least: (1) a written statement that he or she accepts his or her appoint-
ment and corresponding responsibilities; and, (2) the FIP’s “Regulation,”
a document that establishes certain rules regarding the operation and ad-
ministration of the fund.45  As discussed below, FIPs issue “quotas” to in-
vestors to fund themselves.  The FIP’s Regulation must specifically discuss
how the FIP will amortize the quotas it issues to its investors to raise its
capital.46  Further, the Regulation must specify criteria to determine which
publicly-held companies will be eligible to receive its investments.47  There
is no uniform time frame for FIPs registration, since each city varies
widely in the amount of time it takes to process registrations.  To gauge
how much time to allocate towards registering at the city level, the inves-
tor must speak with local counsel.  Second, after registering its acts of in-
corporation, the FIP must enroll at the Brazilian Federal Taxpayer’s
Registry of the Ministry of Finance (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurı́di-
cas or “CNPJ”).  By enrolling at CNPJ the FIP receives a national tax ID
number, which allows the federal government to collect taxes from the FIP
each year.  Notably, the FIP is not subject to Brazil’s Corporate Income
Tax, Social Contribution on Profits Tax, Property Participation Program
Contribution Tax, or Social Security Financing Contribution tax.48  Finally,
before the FIP can start operating, the investor must register it with the
41. Latin Am. Private Equity & Venture Capital Ass’n., Private Equity Tax Benefits of
Brazilian FIPs, LAVCA (Sept. 8, 2009), http://lavca.org/2009/09/08/private-equity-tax-benefits-
of-brazilian-fips/ [hereinafter Tax Benefits of Brazilian FIPs].
42. CMV Instruction No. 391/03, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/cvm_391.
ASP.
43. Id.
44. Marcos Rafael Flesch & Marina da Silva Prado, Private Equity/ Venture Capital
Funds in Brazil Fundos de Investimento em Participações-FIPs, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS WITH BRAZIL 81, 87 (Beatriz Franco et al. eds., 2008).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 82.
47. Id. at 83.
48. Tax Benefits of Brazilian FIPs, supra note 41.
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CVM.  To do so, the FIP must provide the following documents: the FIP’s
incorporation acts (discussed above); a statement indicating that the FIP
has contracted an independent auditor; a statement indicating how many
quotas the FIP will issue to raise its funds, and at what price and what cost
these quotas represent to the FIP, as well as any other information rele-
vant to quota distribution.49  The FIP must also provide any marketing
material, including offering memoranda, that the FIP intends to circulate,
and any additional information that the FIP will disclose to potential in-
vestors.50  The marketing material must show risks related to concentra-
tion and potential non-liquidity of the portfolio’s assets.51  Finally, the FIP
must provide a brief description of the qualifications of the administrator
and manager’s personnel (if any).  If the administrator is not a financial
institution, the administrator must include a statement in which he agrees
to retain a financial institution to conduct FIP activities.  Once these docu-
ments are presented at the CVM, the FIP is registered automatically and
may begin conducting business.52  Frequently, the CVM does not conduct
a thorough review of the documents, but may require supplemental infor-
mation after the FIP has already begun its operations. Usually, the request
for supplemental information does not interfere with the FIP’s function-
ing.53  According to Veirano Advogados, the process of registering with
the CVM usually takes six months.54
After going through the necessary registration leg-work, a FIP may be-
gin the fundraising process by issuing “quotas” to qualified investors.
Under Article 109 of CVM Instruction No. 409/04, only qualified investors
may invest in FIPs quotas, and must make a minimum investment of at
least R$100,000 per investor.55  Qualified investors include: financial insti-
tutions, insurance and capitalization companies, private pension funds, in-
dividuals or corporations who have at least R$300,000 in other
investments, investment funds made up exclusively of qualified investors,
portfolio managers and securities consultants licensed by the CVM, and
employees or partners of managing institutions (as long as they are au-
thorized by the CVM).56  If an investor decides to invest in a FIP he does
so through an “investment commitment.”
Foreign investors may also choose to invest in a FIP’s quotas.  Invest-
ments in FIPs by foreign investors are considered portfolio investments,
which are governed by the National Monetary Council’s Resolution No.
2,689/00.  Accordingly, these types of investments are frequently called
49. Flesch & Silva Prado, supra note 44, at 86-87
50. Id. at 87.
51. Id. at 88.
52. Id. at 87.
53. Id. at 86.
54. Lobo, supra note 39.
55. CMV Instruction No. 409/04, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/cvm_409.
ASP
56. Flesch & Silva Prado, supra note 44, at 82-83.
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“2,689 Investments.”  Nonresident investors must meet a few require-
ments before making a 2,689 Investment.  First, they must designate at
least one representative in Brazil.57  Second, they must fill out a form that
identifies them and their representative and describes their fiscal resources
to make the investment as well as a declaration of intention to do so.58
Finally, they must register with the CVM under Regulation No. 325/00.59
Upon receipt of the documents required to register at the CVM, the CVM
will respond to the investor’s application within 24 hours, signaling a will-
ingness on the part of the Brazilian Government to expedite these types of
investments.60  Finally, the investor must contract with an entity author-
ized by the CVM to maintain custody of the negotiated securities.61  The
default rule is that each quota grants a holder a single vote at the inves-
tor’s meetings.  However, the FIP may define different classes of voting
rights attached to different classes of quotas by so specifying in its charter.
Doing all of these things completes the set-up of the private equity fund as
a FIP, and the fund is ready to begin making investments in target
companies.
The FIP structure provides investors with numerous benefits, including
favorable tax treatment.  The FIP vehicle circumvents Brazil’s lack of a
limited partnership form by providing similar tax benefits to those enjoyed
by private equity funds structured as limited partnerships in the United
States.  Investor’s income and capital gains are not typically subject to the
same taxes that many Brazilian companies frequently need to pay, includ-
ing: Brazilian withholding tax, Brazil’s corporate income tax, the “social
contribution on profits,” the “profit participation program contribution,”
and the “social security financing contribution.”62  Further, on December
1, 2011, Brazil eliminated the financial operations tax charged on most
foreign investments for FIPs.63  In a statement, the Brazilian Finance Min-
ister announced that the measure was taken to stimulate the Brazilian
economy.64  FIPs let investors use “tax shields” when funds incur losses
and to collect income tax at their own tax rates (as opposed to the higher
corporate rate).65  Pension funds and other institutional investors may also
like to invest in FIPs because they allow capital to be raised by means of
57. Id. at 89-90.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. CVM Information of Interest to Foreign Investors, available at http://www.cvm.
gov.br/port/relinter/ingles/info_invest_estrang-e.asp.
61. CMN Resolution 2,689, available at http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/rules/
download/ResolutionCMN2689.pdf.
62. Tax Benefits of Brazilian FIPs, supra note 41.
63. Caroline Hornby, Brazil Eases Entry for Global Investors—Eliminates IOF Tax,
TOTAL ASSET (Dec. 2, 2011), http://blogs.terrapinn.com/total-asset/2011/12/02/brazil-eases-
entry-global-investors-eliminates-iof-tax/.
64. Id.
65. Flesch & Silva Prado, supra note 44, at 92.
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an offering which is less onerous than the requirements for conducting an
IPO.66
Managers of private equity funds may prefer the FIP structure because
it allows the fund to hold equity ownership in a portfolio company in a
way that is similar to a holding company, but in a form that is generally
less bureaucratic, less expensive, and generally more tax efficient.67  The
FIP structure also allows the fund manager to have wide discretion regard-
ing the range of permissible activities undertaken by the fund.  For exam-
ple, the FIP’s manager or investors can decide on their own provisions for
capital requirements, investment policies, capital call guidelines, amortiza-
tion structure, and terms of investment.68
One disadvantage of choosing to structure a private equity fund as a
FIP is that the fund does not provide limited liability for investors as asso-
ciated with other fund corporate forms.69  Even if the fund manager and
investors act in the regular course of business, if the FIP acquires a nega-
tive net worth, all equity holders will be responsible for covering any nega-
tive amounts.70  Some investors also see the requirement that investors
stay involved in the decision-making process of the portfolio companies,
notably through appointment of the board of directors, as problematic.71
As shown in Table 2, between 2004 and 2009, the number of FIPs and
amount of capital committed to them grew significantly.  FIPs passed lim-
ited partnerships organized outside of Brazil and became the most popular
type of investment vehicle by 2009.  While FIPS only represented 11 per-
cent of the investment vehicles used in 2004, by 2009, 28 percent of invest-
ment vehicles were structured as FIPs.  The low level of FIPs in 2004 is
likely explained by the fact that they had only come into existence through
CVM instruction 391/03 half a year earlier, in June 2003.  As discussed
above, the tax advantages of the FIP structure likely provide the primary
basis for its rise in popularity among private equity investors.  More im-
portantly though, FIPs have surpassed limited partnerships due to a Sep-
tember 2009 National Monetary Council resolution increasing the amount
of money that Brazilian pension funds could make in alternative invest-
ments (including private equity) from 2 percent of their investments to 20
percent.72  Just as ERISA in the United States allowed pension funds to
make alternative investments in private equity funds, so too this resolution
66. Ricardo C. Veirano & Gustavo Moraes Stolagli, Brazilian Regulatory Private Eq-
uity Investment Funs-FIPs: Advantages and Benefits, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS WITH BRAZIL 93, 93-94 (Beatriz Franco et al., eds., 2008).




71. The participation of investors in the decision-making process is discussed in more
detail in the next section involving “Stage Two” on investing in target companies.
72. Second Brazilian Census, surpa note 30, at 129.
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liberated a significant source of new capital in the market.73  Today, pen-
sion funds provide most of the committed capital in Brazil, and make most
of their investments through FIPS.74  Other reasons, aside from tax bene-
fits, also contribute to the FIPs’ rise in popularity.  After the CVM specifi-
cally allowed the FIP form, President Lula Da Silva’s “blessed” the
organizational form by publicly endorsing it at a time when investors
feared that the Brazilian Government would “lean left,” like many other
Latin American nations, undermining free-market-oriented investment
conditions.75  Specifically, investors were concerned that the previous
monetary policies that had been enacted, such as setting inflation targets
and primary surplus control, might be abandoned.76  The timely creation
of the FIP likely signaled to investors that the Brazilian Government in-
tended to encourage, and therefore protect, this type of investment.
The FIP’s rise to prominence may be a good thing insofar as it signals
that the Brazilian Government was effectively able to create an invest-
ment vehicle and have investors use it for its intended purpose.  As FIPs
become more prevalent, the CVM will likely become more familiar with
the way that a private equity fund organized as a FIP should look when it
reviews registration material.  On the other hand, the prominence of FIPs
may lead to the rise of “boiler plate” language that lawyers learn to put in
the FIP organizational documents so as not to raise any eyebrows at the
CVM, which may make it harder for CVM officials (in their cursory re-
view of registration materials) to detect risks disclosed in the organiza-
tional documents.  Still, this risk is mitigated by the fact that FIPs must
include information specific to their own investment strategy, which is
likely the information to which the CVM will pay most attention, due to its
potential impact on retail investors.
On balance, the creation of FIPs as an investment vehicle in 2003 is a
very positive development for the Brazilian private equity market.  These
types of funds have been wildly popular and today are the most common
form of private equity investment fund organization in Brazil.  Because
the FIPs insist on quality accounting and corporate governance standards
(discussed later), the availability of these funds increases the legitimacy of
the Brazilian private equity industry generally and attracts international
investment.
3. Mutual Funds Investing in Emerging Companies (“FMIEEs”)
Mutual Funds Investing in Emerging Companies (Fundos Mútuos de
Investimento em Empresas Emergentes, or “FMIEEs”) are a special type
of investment vehicle designed specifically for venture capital investments
73. See id.
74. Id. at 143.
75. De Carvalho et al., supra note 3, at 3-4.
76. See Prahl et al., supra note 13, at 5.
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and regulated by the CVM’s Instruction 209/94.77  FMIEEs are closed-end
partnerships with 10-year terms, with the possibility for extension of the
term.  Notably, FMIEE’s may only have a maximum of 35 investors and
may only invest in corporations that have a net revenue below R$150 mil-
lion on the date that the first investment is made.78  FMIEE’s must un-
dergo a registration process very similar to that of FIPs.
Funds that intend to invest in seed capital, start-up, and expansion gen-
erally take advantage of the FMIEE form.79  Due to the revenue cap on
portfolio companies, FMIEEs are usually unsuitable for funds that intend
to invest in companies at more advanced investment stages such as acqui-
sition finance, turnaround finance, or bridge finance.80  An investor might
choose to set up an emerging companies investment fund because he
wishes to structure his portfolio in a way that allows him to make a high
risk, potentially high reward investment in a relatively unknown company.
Surprisingly, while FIPs became more popular in recent year, FMIEEs
have become significantly less popular, dropping from 22 percent of in-
vestment vehicle types used in 2004 to 14 percent in 2009.  Capital commit-
ted to FMIEEs was minimal in both 2004 (3 percent of total investments)
and 2009 (2 percent).  The unpopularity of FMIEEs continued into 2010.
According to the CVM’s 2010 Annual Report, only 29 FMIEE funds were
registered on the last day of 2009.81  In 2010, only one new FMIEE was
registered  and another was cancelled, leaving the total number of FMIEE
funds at the end of 2010 at 29 as well.82  By contrast, 258 FIPs were regis-
tered by the end of 2009, and 388 FIPs were registered by the end of 2010,
resulting in a 130 new registration increase in FIPs as of 2010.
This data may suggest that FIPs are preferred to FMIEEs to finance
startups, or that funds deem fewer early stage companies worthy of invest-
ment.  Many successful Brazilian businesses are family-owned institutions
that have worked diligently for many years at developing a brand and a
client base.  It may be that investors are less impressed at the prospects of
newer untested companies in Brazil.  Alternatively, it may be that inves-
tors simply prefer to use the FIP form, which has no capital limits, to in-
vest in early stage companies.
The availability of FMIEEs as an investment vehicle is a positive devel-
opment because it encourages investment in early stage organizations,
which may have less access to credit and may present higher potential for
77. CVM Instruction No. 209, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/asp/cvmwww/atos/
exiato.asp?Tipo=I&File=/inst/inst209.htm
78. Fabio Campos Mello & Marcus Vinicius Bitencourt, Brazil: Private Equity Finds a




81. PUB. AFFAIRS & PRESS LIAISON & RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DEPT, SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N OF BRAZIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, (2010).
82. Id.
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profit.  However, the data suggests that the Brazilian Government has not
done enough to foster the kind of regulatory atmosphere that encourages
people to take advantage of this type of fund.  Since increased innovation
and entrepreneurial activity is generally considered a positive factor for
macroeconomic growth, a reassessment of FMIEEs’ incentive structure
may be in order.  It may well be time to make FMIEEs as attractive as
FIPs, or even provide additional tax breaks for these types of investments.
4. Holding Companies
Private equity funds may also be organized as holding companies, and
until recently, this was a fairly popular way of setting up a private equity
fund.  According to the Getulio Vargas Foundation, holding companies
tend to invest in small to medium-sized enterprises, especially venture cap-
ital operations.83  For reasons discussed below, these types of funds have
become much less common, so discussion of their setup is limited, and a
greater focus has been placed on an explanation of why they have de-
creased in popularity.
Generally, the process for setting up a fund as a holding company in-
cludes registering it as either a corporation or a limited liability company.
If the holding companies choose to register they are subject to the Brazil-
ian Civil Code’s Corporations Law (Lei das Sociedade Anónima), and re-
gistration of holding companies is governed by Law Number 4131/62.
Choosing the Limited Liability Company (Limitada) form has the notable
advantage of insulating directors from liability for negative equity, except
in the case of fraud and related crimes.84  Organizational documents in-
clude articles of association or bylaws, and possibly a shareholders-inves-
tors’ agreement.85  Law number 8934/94 explains how to register a
Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) at the Commercial Registry (Registro
Commercial) of each state.  This note will not detail the registration re-
quirements.  In general, it takes one month to incorporate a holding com-
pany in Brazil, either as a limited liability company or a corporation.86  A
fund might still choose to set up an LLC because it wishes to take less risk
for the performance of the fund, which may signal to investors the riski-
ness of the investment and allow them to price their risks and rewards
investment accordingly.
The data related to investor choice shows that holding companies have
become less and less popular as an investment vehicle type and have come
to hold less committed capital over the past several years.  As demon-
strated in the graphs above, 21 percent of private equity investment funds
83. OVERVIEW, supra note 32.
84. Ricardo C. Veirano & Gustavo Moraes Stolagli, Brazilian Regulatory Private Eq-
uity Investment Funs-FIPs: Advantages and Benefits, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS WITH BRAZIL 93 (Beatriz Franco et al., eds., 2008).
85. Baker & McKenzie, et al., Private Equity in Brazil 7 (Nov. 2008), http://brazilian
chamber.org.uk/sites/default/files/comittee-files/privateequityinbrazil1.pdf.
86. Id.
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were structured as holding companies in Brazil in 2004 and these held 9
percent of the industry’s total committed capital.  By 2009, however, hold-
ing companies had been somewhat eclipsed by FIPs, and shrunk to 13 per-
cent of the remaining organizational forms, holding only three percent of
the industry’s committed capital.  Two significant disadvantages of the
holding company structure as compared with the FIPs likely explain this
change.  First, profits are taxed at a much higher level than those that are
generated under the FIP form.87  While the FIP itself never needs to pay a
capital gains tax, holding companies must pay a 34 percent capital gains
tax for the sale of equity investments held by the holding company.88
While Brazilian FIP investors only pay a 15 percent capital gains tax due
when they redeem their quotas (this is taxation at the individual income
tax level as opposed to the FIP level), Brazilian holding company investors
must pay a 20 percent capital gains tax on any capital gains.89  Interna-
tional FIP investors that hold less than 40 percent of a FIP’s quota pay no
capital gains taxes whatsoever, and those who hold more than 40 percent
pay a 15 percent capital gains tax, while international investors who invest
in holding companies pay a 15 percent capital gains tax no matter how
small a stake they hold in the fund.90  Second, on top of this unfavorable
tax treatment, whereas the FIP form allows write-offs in case of losses,
only in limited circumstances may holding companies write off losses due
to unsuccessful investments.91
5. Other Investment Vehicles: Real Estate Funds and
Infrastructure Funds
The Brazilian Government has sought to encourage investment in cer-
tain industries by providing incentives for investors to create FIPs that in-
vest primarily in one type of company or project.  As the graphs in Table 2
illustrate, other investments grew from representing 15 percent of commit-
ted capital in 2004 to 28 percent of committed capital in 2009.  While there
are several different types of “other” investments, two of the most impor-
tant are highlighted in this section.  Private equity investors who seek to
make large investments in real estate or infrastructure can take advantage
of two special investment vehicles tailored to suit those goals.
The set-up of a real estate fund is essentially the same procedure as
that used to set up a FIP, but with the additional requirement that at least
90% of the real estate fund’s investments be made in real-estate.  If an
investor knows that he plans to invest primarily in real estate, this type of
fund provides some tax advantages to encourage him to do so.  The Brazil-
87. De Carvalho et al., supra note 3, at 7.
88. Second Brazilian Census, supra note 30, at 70.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. De Carvalho, supra note 3 at 7.
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ian real estate market is growing dramatically, so this type of fund has
become more popular in recent years.
Infrastructure Investment Funds (Infrastructure FIPs) were established
by Law No. 11,478/07.  In passing that law, the Brazilian Government’s
main goal was to encourage investments in infrastructure.92  Specifically,
as part of their economic acceleration plan, the government sought to en-
courage investment in energy, transportation, water, sanitation and irriga-
tion projects.93  Consequently, 95 percent of an Infrastructure FIP’s funds
must be invested in infrastructure projects.94  Infrastructure FIPs require
the FIP to organize as a corporation (sociedade por ações or sociedade
anônima, or “”S.A.””).  These are governed by Law No. 6.404/76, “the
Corporation’s Law,” which was revised by Law No. 9.457/97.  Regulations
require that Infrastructure FIPs comprise at least 10 different quota hold-
ers and that each of these holders hold no more than 20 percent of the
issued quotas or get more than 20 percent of the fund’s total income.95  An
investor might choose to set up an infrastructure investment fund because
he wishes to make a long-term investment with relatively stable returns.
The need for infrastructure projects in Brazil is immense, and an investor
who has taken more risky positions in other more volatile markets may
attempt to balance his portfolio by investing in infrastructure, which is
viewed as more stable.
The government has shown its support for infrastructure projects by
reducing the tax on financial operations, or IOF for private equity vehi-
cles.  On December 15, 2010, the Treasury announced that it was reducing
the IOF tax from 6% to 2% to stimulate private sector funding for long-
term projects and discussed a growing need for infrastructure improve-
ments.96  As discussed in the section on FIPs earlier, the tax has further
been reduced to zero.
The availability of industry-specific types of investment vehicles that
are specifically encouraged by the Brazilian Government appears to be a
good thing insofar as it allows the Brazilian Government to identify areas
of strategic growth of the country and to encourage private investment in
those areas.  It seems that the possibility of arbitrage is low because it is
probably easy to tell whether something is an infrastructure investment or
a real estate investment, but it may be difficult to determine what consti-
tutes an “emerging company.”  Further, it could be that companies that
specialize in one particular area, for example “Oil and Gas,” may simply
create a subsidiary specialized in a different area, for example “infrastruc-
ture,” simply in order to receive funds for one particular type of project.  If
92. Second Brazilian Census, supra note 30, at 88-89.
93. Id. at 88.
94. Id. at 89.
95. Id.
96. Juliana Rocha, et. al., Governo retoma IOF de 2% sobre algumas operações,
FOLHA DE S. PAULO, Dec. 15, 2010, available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/
846392-governo-retoma-iof-de-2-sobre-algumas-operacoes.shtml.
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this sort of investment is allowed, it will be important to keep the funds
given to the subsidiary through the infrastructure private equity fund sepa-
rate from any concurrent projects undertaken by the parent company.
This separation of funds may require additional regulatory oversight.
B. Stage Two: Issues for Investing in the Targeted Company
Once a private equity investor has chosen which institutional form to
use to set up the private equity vehicle, the investor will begin investing in
the targeted company.  The investor’s general goal at this point is to gain
control of the company in a way that will allow the investor to make deci-
sions that increase its value, so that the investor can eventually sell it for a
profit.
A threshold question is whether Brazil has the appropriate legal pro-
tections for shareholders in place that will encourage private equity fund
investors to actually make investments in portfolio companies.  Basic prin-
ciples of corporate governance require that a corporation must maximize
the objectives of its shareholders.  Usually, basic rights that shareholders
insist upon include access to relevant, timely information, the ability to
participate in and vote at shareholder’s meetings, and the ability to elect
members of the portfolio company’s board of advisors.97
To encourage investment, countries must protect both majority and mi-
nority shareholders.  In countries like Brazil, where older companies are
frequently controlled by a few influential shareholders (typically members
of a family), protections for minority shareholders has become increas-
ingly important.98  In these countries, majority shareholders will seek to
maximize their own interests, possibly at the expense of minority share-
holders.  Simultaneously, minority shareholders suffer from a “free-rider
problem,” which undermines their incentives to effectively monitor major-
ity shareholders.99
Brazil has significantly improved its protections of shareholders in re-
cent years in ways that encourage private equity investment.  In 1997,
rights for minority shareholders were particularly weak in Brazil.  At that
time, there were no tag-along rights for minority shareholders, and no
97. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.
98. See generally Sang-Woo Nam & Il Chong Nam, Corporate Governance in Asia ch.
5 (2004) available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2005.01.book.corporate.governance.asia.pdf
(discussing the need to for protections for minority shareholders in Asia) and S. Wade Angus
and Mariana Pargendler, Private Equity in Brazil: Opportunities and Challenges for Foreign
Investors, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES at 77 (March 2007 Private Equity Alert), http://www.
weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8017 (discussing the importance of minority protections
in Brazil and noting that many Brazilian companies are still managed by family members
who are related to the initial founders of the business).
99. See generally NAM & NAM, supra note 98.
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withdrawal rights in mergers and spin-offs.100  These laws led to low levels
of minority investor confidence and encouraged investment based solely
on majority, controlling positions.101  Then, in 2001, the Brazilian Con-
gress reduced the limit of nonvoting stocks from two thirds to 50 percent
of total capital stock.  Additionally, Congress reinstated tag-along rights
for holders of voting shares who paid up to 80 percent of the price paid for
the controlling stock, and provided additional advantages for preferred
shareholders, including the option to establish certain mandatory mini-
mum dividends for preferred stocks, pricing those dividends higher than
voting stocks, and allowing preferred shareholders to have additional tag-
along rights upon the sale of the controlling interest.102  These reforms are
generally believed to increase minority shareholder investor protection in
Brazil.103
1. Permissible Types of Investments and Portfolio Limitations
When choosing a target company (hereinafter “portfolio companies”)
to invest in, there are some limitations on what types of investment a pri-
vate equity vehicle organized as a FIP may make.  FIPs may make invest-
ments in publicly or privately held corporations in exchange for equity,
debt, or instruments exchangeable or convertible into equity.104  FIPs may
not invest directly into other types of companies like limited liability com-
panies, real estate property, or investments outside of Brazil.105  In 2011,
the CVM introduced additional portfolio-shaping guidelines in Instruction
496/11.  That instruction requires that at least 90 percent of a private eq-
uity fund’s equity come from stocks, bonds, and securities in a privately
held company.106  The 2011 new portfolio-shaping limitations clarify that
investors cannot take advantage of the FIP structure’s tax benefits to
make investments that would otherwise have been taxed at higher rates.
Regulators realized a potential for regulatory arbitrage when Brazilian tax
law charged a Financial Operations Tax on foreign investors which varied
significantly based on which type of investment the investor made.107
“Equity investments” carried a 2 percent tax and “government bonds” car-
ried a 6 percent tax.  Without portfolio-shaping regulations, foreign inves-
tors were able to use the unregulated private equity fund structure to buy
100. Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders of Listed Cor-
porations in Brazil: Brief History, Legal Structure, and Empirical Evidence, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD.
147, 152-53 (2011).
101. Id. at 153.
102. Id. at 154-55.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Baker & McKenzie et al., supra note 85.
106. Id.
107. Marcelo Loureiro, CVM Redefines Private Equity Fund Portfolios, 1 CAPITAL
ABERTO INTERNATIONAL EDITION no. 3 (July-Sep. 2011), http://www.capitalaberto.com/eng
lish/ler_artigo.php?pag=7&sec=111&i=3410.
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Brazilian Government bonds and call them equity investments, enjoying a
significant tax advantage.  Instruction 496/11 resolves this arbitrage prob-
lem by introducing portfolio-shaping guidelines.108  This measure seems
prudent and is commendable.
2. Choosing a Portfolio Company
Many factors contribute to a private equity fund’s decision to invest in
a particular portfolio company, including the investor’s desired returns,
appetite for risk, and the results of due diligence.  One crucial difference
between the U.S. private equity model and the Brazilian private equity
model is the way investment decisions are made.  In the United States,
investors typically take a “hands off” approach and allow the general part-
ners of the fund to make investment decisions.  Comparatively, Brazil’s
investment decision-making process is notable for the widespread use of
“investment committees.”  Under this model, investment decisions are
shared by fund managers and investors.  According to the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, among those funds that use investment committees, 43 per-
cent require approval from a simple majority before making investment
decisions, 32 percent require a qualified majority, and 25 percent require
unanimity.109
Fabio Massao Inocima praises the use of “investment committees” as a
corporate governance model commonly used in Brazilian private equity
investment vehicles.  Massao Inocima points out that because the fund
manager usually has only one or two seats on the investment committee,
which is typically comprised of four to eight members, the requirements
for majorities, qualified majorities, and unanimity (as the case may be)
reduces information asymmetries between principals (investor) and agents
(fund managers).110  Accordingly, this reduces agency costs and improves
investor protection.111  At least in theory, this may also produce better
quality investments, since investors will conduct a more stringent screen-
ing at the beginning of the investment cycle, possibly lowering the chances
that the fund manager will pay too much for a company or make a poor
investment decision.112
On the other hand, some US investors find the involvement of invest-
ment committees burdensome.  For these investors, the consensus building
process undermines efficiency and gives investors too much say in leader-
108. CVM edita Instrução que altera regras sobre composição da carteira dos FIP, avail-
able at http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/infos/Comunicado-496.asp.
109. OVERVIEW, supra note 32.
110. Fabio Massao Inocima, Governance, Leverage, and Cyclicality: The Efficiency of
the Brazilian Private Equity Model 26 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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ship decisions, particularly when the investors involve large Brazilian pen-
sion funds, which are increasingly vocal in management decisions.113
3. Gaining Control of the Portfolio Company
FIPs must exert real influence on the strategic policies of the compa-
nies that they invest in and participate in their management.114  There are
two ways that a FIP can fulfill the “real influence” requirement: (1) they
can purchase a minority equity interest in a company and execute a share-
holders (or “quota-holders” agreement) to grant them effective control;
or, (2) they can buy a majority interest in a portfolio company and obtain
statutorily-defined levels of control.115  Each of these ways of gaining con-
trol, and their benefits and downsides, are discussed in this section.
Before embarking on a discussion of how to make majority or minority
investments in target portfolio companies, it would be useful to know ex-
actly how many firms actually take on minority positions versus majority
positions and which techniques are used to gain control of most compa-
nies.  However, since companies are not required to disclose this informa-
tion for private acquisitions at present, information regarding actual
investment behavior is mostly anecdotal.
According to a 2007 private equity report by Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
LLP, the strategy most commonly used by most private equity sponsors in
Brazil at that time was to acquire a controlling position in local companies,
either by purchasing common stock or other equity interests.116  However,
since the financial crisis there appears to be a clear trend towards taking
minority positions in Brazil.117  For example, Gávea Investimentos, a Bra-
zilian private equity firm, bases its entire strategy on acquiring minority
positions in firms.118  Gávea acquires 10 to 25 percent minority stakes in
companies because it believes the premium for control is too high in Bra-
zil.119  This strategy led Gávea to be a local industry leader and to its re-
cent acquisition by JPMorgan.120
113. Battle for Private Equity Autonomy, BRAZIL CONFIDENTIAL (Jan. 6, 2012), http://
www.brazilconfidential.com/Finance/FundFlows/Features/Finance/article/20120106/82462d7
4-2736-11e1-a82d-00144f2af8e8/Battle-for-private-equity-autonomy.
114. CMV Instruction No. 391/03, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/cvm_391.
ASP.
115. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 85.
116. Angus & Pargendler, supra note 98.
117. Daniel de Souza et al., Private Equity in Brazil: Entering a New Era, KNOWL-
EDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 26, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=
2685. See also Baker & McKenzie, supra note 85, at 5; The Buys from Brazil: This Year’s Hot
Market for Private-Equity Firms and Hedge-Fund Managers, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2011,
at 6 [hereinafter The Buys].
118. de Souza, supra note 117.
119. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 4.
120. Id.
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“Club deals”—in which three or more managers of different private
equity funds unite to capitalize a portfolio company and compete with
larger private equity firms—are popular in more developed private equity
markets but are not yet common in Brazil.  Some believe this type of in-
vestment strategy is just around the corner in Brazil due to the increased
number of private equity firms sprouting up in the country and the compe-
tition among them.121  If club deals do emerge, these would allow private
equity fund managers to seek out partnerships with other managers when
they identify an investment they would like to make, but cannot afford
alone.  If the private equity fund manager sees a significant upside to the
investment and trusts the other private equity funds involved, he would be
able to realize profits on deals that would otherwise be inaccessible.122
Portfolio companies could benefit by having increased access to capital
and gain additional perspectives and guidance in their investment deci-
sions, possibly improving their operations.123  For now, simply buying a
minority or majority equity stake in a portfolio company remains the
norm.
a. Buying Minority Equity Interests and Using Shareholder’s Agreements
One common way to gain control over a portfolio company is to buy a
minority stake in the company and then execute a shareholder’s (or
“quota holder’s”) agreement with the controlling shareholders to grant the
private equity company certain powers.  If the company is publicly traded,
private equity funds can gain control over it by buying a minority stake
and executing a shareholders’ agreement between the fund and the other
equity holders of the portfolio company.  If the company is privately held,
it will also issue shares or quotas (depending on their organizational form)
to their investors.  Just as with publicly-traded companies, shareholder’s or
quota holder’s allow a private equity fund to buy a minority equity stake
in a privately traded company and contract with the current owners in a
way that grants the private equity fund the power to make the important
managerial decisions and exercise real influence over the company with-
out gaining a majority position.
According to Baker & McKenzie, Brazilian shareholder’s agreements
usually provide the private equity firm with certain veto powers over ma-
jor decisions to be made in the firm, the ability to appoint members of the
board of advisors, the ability to have a say whenever there will be a trans-
fer of equity ownership (e.g., rights of first refusal, first offer, tag-along,
and drag-along rights), and rights related to exit opportunities and obliga-
tions, such as put option rights, redemption rights, and a clause acknowl-
121. Marila Avila, Buyers’ Club: Mega-Operations and Fiercer Competition Among Pri-
vate Equity Managers Indicate that “Club Deals” Will Soon Reach Brazil, CAPITAL ABERTO
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edging that the parties intend to exit as soon as possible.124  The
shareholder’s agreement also specifies that the portfolio company must
give the investors or board of directors regular updates and provide them
with information in a timely manner, reserving the right for investors to
appoint independent accountants if they see fit.  If the private equity firm
believes that it may exit through an IPO on the U.S. market, the share-
holder’s agreement will contain some registration rights, which allow in-
vestors to demand that the company register with the SEC, or “piggy
back” registration rights, which allow the investors the option of having
their shares registered at the same time that other shares in the company
are registered.125
Generally, the usefulness of a shareholder’s agreement is that it allows
companies to negotiate control without expending significant amounts of
money to actually purchase shares in the company.  This can benefit the
existing shareholders, because they are able to retain their equity interests
in the company and (while giving up some amount of control) may benefit
from the advice and expertise of the private equity firm, which makes their
shares more valuable.
b. Buying Majority Equity Interests in Portfolio Companies
Without a shareholder or quota-holders agreement, a private equity
fund may purchase shares or quotas from the investors that own them to
gain control.  If the privately-held portfolio company is organized as a lim-
ited liability company, it issues “quotas” to raise its funds.  Where there is
no quota-holders agreement in place, “control” of a limited liability com-
pany is defined as holding at least 75 percent of its capital.126  If the pri-
vately-held portfolio company is organized as a closed-end corporation
(Sociedade Anomima de Capital Fechado), the private equity vehicle will
purchase the company’s “shares.”127  In this case, control without a share-
holder’s agreement is defined as having rights that permanently assure the
party of a simple majority (50%) in votes of general meetings, the power
to elect a majority of the corporation’s officers, and actually using this
power to direct the corporate activities.128  The techniques and procedures
for obtaining these levels of control vary based on whether the target port-
folio company is publicly or privately held.
124. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 85, at 8.
125. Id.
126. Tozzini, Freire, Foreign Investment in Brazil, TEIXEIRA E SILVA ADVOGADOS
(March 2004), http://www.prac.org/newsletters/Foreign_Investment_In_Brazil.pdf
127. Lei Das Sociedades Anônimas [Article 1 of Law No. 6,404 of December 15, 1976,
Brazilian Corporations Law], available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/law6404r.ASP.
128. Lei Das Sociedades Anônimas [Article 116 of Law No. 6,404 of December 15,
1976, Brazilian Corporations Law], available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/law6404r.
ASP.
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i. Majority Interests in Publicly-Traded Companies
When the target company is a publicly traded company, the CVM will
regulate the purchase of its shares.  FIPs may purchase stock, debentures,
subscription bonuses, and other securities, which can be converted into
stock when these are issued by publicly-held or closely-held companies;
but only previously specified publicly-held companies may receive invest-
ments from FIPs.129  The FIP’s Regulation (the document that the orga-
nizer provides at the funds registration) specifies which publicly-held
companies can receive a FIP’s investments.  Accordingly, a FIP cannot just
invest in publicly-held companies haphazardly; such investment must be
part of its strategic plan from the time of set-up.  If a FIP wishes to simply
buy up shares on the open market using accumulated funds, the process
for purchasing shares will be overseen by the CVM.
The mechanism requiring FIPs to specify which types of publicly
traded companies will receive an investment appears to be a good thing
insofar as it gives the CVM notice about which FIPs will have a role in-
vesting in the Brazilian stock markets, the CVM’s primary area of con-
cern.  It also encourages sound planning at the setup stage to develop an
investment strategy before raising funds, which contributes to investor
protection.  Notably, qualified investors would most likely insist on this
type of foresight and planning even without this regulation, so it likely
does not impose additional costs on the FIP and, on balance, probably
only helps the CVM carry out its mission.
The most common strategy employed by private equity firms in Brazil
to invest in a public target company is to use the money that the FIP has
raised to acquire a controlling position in a company by purchasing com-
mon stock or other voting equity interests.130  If the FIP does not have a
large amount of money available to buy enough equity to gain control of
the company, it may use debt to purchase the necessary shares.  In a lever-
aged buyout (“LBO”) situation, the investor uses debt instruments from
bank and capital markets to purchase a controlling interest in a company.
The assets of the company being “bought out” are used as collateral in this
transaction.
Leveraged buyouts are very uncommon in Brazil because Brazil has
not developed a strong local debt financing market.131  Most deals are fi-
nanced entirely with equity, and when debt is taken out, the deals tend to
have low debt-to-equity ratios.132  In general, Brazilian private equity
deals are financed, on average, with zero percent debt; furthermore, when
leverage is used, it is limited to two and a half times EBITDA (Earnings
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization, a metric used to
attempt to measure cash earnings).133  By contrast, U.S. and European
129. Flesch & Silva Prado, supra note 44, at 81.
130. Angus & Pargendler, supra note 98, at 77.
131. Id. at 69.
132. See de Souza, supra note 117.
133. Id.
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LBO markets have used leverage as much as four to seven times
EBITDA.134
LBOs are uncommon in Brazil because debt is extremely expensive, as
compared to other countries.  In February 2011, the average rate for a
commercial business loan was 29 percent.135  Historically, the Banco Na-
cional de Desenvolvimento (BNDES) was the only source of debt financ-
ing available to private equity sponsors, meaning that there was little
competition for debt financing and that firms suffered higher prices.136
Furthermore, interest rates in Brazil have historically been quite high as
compared to other places in the world, increasing the cost of debt financ-
ing.  The graph below in Table 4 demonstrates the cost of debt in Brazil, as
measured by the lending interest rate, compared to the cost of debt in the
United States, between 1997 and 2010 (created using data from the World
Bank137 in combination with Google’s Public Data Feature).138
TABLE 4: COST OF DEBT IN BRAZIL COMPARED TO
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Brazil
United States
There is a significant amount of literature that suggests that Brazil’s
lack of leverage is actually a good thing for the Brazilian private equity
industry.  Fabio Massao Inocima argues that the lack of leverage in acqui-
sitions in Brazil allows for better protection of limited partners’ interests
and a more efficient investment model that enjoys a countercyclical na-
134. Id.
135. The Buys, supra note 117.
136. Id.
137. Brazil, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil (last visited
Nov. 27, 2012).
138. Public Data, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/publicdata/directory (last visited
Nov. 27, 2012).
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ture.139  As long as the members of the investment committee are as finan-
cially savvy as the general partner, the investment committee does not stall
decision-making to the extent that it results in a competitive disadvantage
for the general partner, and conflicts of interest are avoided.140
Many Brazilian private equity firms similarly believe that the lack of
leverage in the Brazilian private equity markets is an asset.  According to
Caludo Furtado, the executive director of the Center for Private Equity
and Venture Capital Research at the Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brazil’s
lack of leverage means that the private equity industry in Brazil presents
less risk.141  For investments to succeed in Brazil, he argues, private equity
players cannot rely on “financial engineering” but instead must focus on
core strategic and operational improvements, leading to better results.142
Patrice Etline, a managing partner for Latin America at a large private
equity fund, described a successful deal as follows: “We created value not
through changing the capital structure or taking on cheap acquisition
debt.”143  Many Brazilian private equity firms worry that increased lever-
age, even if it means more readily available credit, will be damaging to
Brazil’s private equity market overall.144  Brazilian managers are acutely
aware of the number of highly-leveraged deals that have failed in the
West, and tend to view Brazil’s lack of leverage as one of the industry’s
core assets.145  Alvaro Gonçalves of Stratus, a Brazilian private equity
firm, states, “I hope we can avoid the image that we are raiders and vul-
tures, this is the profile that these large LBO firms left in markets, and we
don’t want them to do that here.”146
High levels of leverage may likely increase systemic risks posed by pri-
vate equity investment activity.  Viral V. Acharya, et al. argue that regula-
tors should better scrutinize the risks inherent in the pre-crisis boom in
LBO financing in the U.S. and Europe.147  The authors suggest that many
of the practices that generated systemic risk in the subprime mortgage in-
dustry also exist for LBOs.  In LBO lending scenarios in the U.S., loans
frequently do not remain on the books of the banks that originate them; so
the originators have less incentive to effectively screen and monitor candi-
dates’ ability to pay them back.148  Further, since LBO loans are often
collateralized, ultimate debt ownership of LBO loans can be opaque;
meaning that a few large defaults might cause funding to dry up for finan-
139. Inocima, supra note 110, at 41.
140. Id.
141. Mitchell, supra note 1.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Buys, supra note 117.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Viral V. Acharya, et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. OF APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 3 (2007).
148. Id. at 4.
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cial institutions.149  Policy-makers should examine, whether incentives are
properly aligned in the debt-origination processes, and attempt to improve
transparency related to debt ownership when LBO loans are collateral-
ized.150  According to the authors, if even a few large LBO deals default,
causing a small shock to the LBO markets, there may be repercussions
similar to those of the subprime market (particularly the drying up of
liquidity).151
However, there are many reasons that Brazil might benefit by lowering
the cost of debt, a policy that would likely encourage leveraged buyouts.
Even though Brazil has successfully developed a private equity industry in
which deals are not highly leveraged and the country has arguably enjoyed
the collateral policy benefit of a decrease in systemic risk, the lack of lev-
erage is merely a byproduct of the country’s extremely high cost of debt,
and not the result of direct regulatory policy choices.  Making debt less
expensive might contribute to dynamism in the real economy by encourag-
ing investment, and allowing those who are potentially well-qualified to
manage large, expensive companies, to do so through leverage.  According
to Prahl et al., in their 2001 Survey of Limited Partners, debt availability
was ranked first in the perception of limited partners and second by gen-
eral partners among the main issues for investors in Brazil.152  The un-
availability of debt on reasonable conditions particularly harms small and
medium-sized enterprises, who struggle to access debt amid double-digit
interest rates and high risk premiums.153  According to the survey, this
means that returns are limited from both debt pay-down and foregone
growth projects.154
ii. Majority Interests in Privately-Held Companies
If a target portfolio company that is privately-held, and the private eq-
uity vehicle is organized as a FIP, the portfolio company must first meet
certain corporate governance standards.  First, the target portfolio com-
pany may not issue special shares for founders (partes beneficiarias) or
redeem those in circulation.155  This prevents against the creation of une-
qual classes of shareholders in which the private equity vehicle’s invest-
ment would be diluted.  Second, all of the members on the board of
directors must have a unified term of one year (no staggering of board
positions).156  This allows the private equity vehicle to know with certainty
the composition of the board and prevents the portfolio company from
retaining de facto control by leaving its own members of the board on for
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Prahl et al., supra note 13.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Flesch & Silva Prado, supra note 44, at 83.
156. Id.
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very long periods of time.  This concern is ameliorated because, in the case
of acquisition, the FIP will be required to appoint members of the portfo-
lio company’s board, as previously discussed.  Next, any related-party
agreements, shareholder’s agreements, and stock options programs must
be disclosed.157  This allows the private equity vehicle to accurately judge
the assets, liabilities, and stake holders associated with the portfolio com-
pany.  The portfolio company must also adopt arbitration procedures to
resolve any future disputes.158  Mandatory arbitration helps avoid the
slow, and sometimes unpredictable, Brazilian court systems.  In the case of
an eventual IPO, the company must agree to list on the Novo Mercado
segment of the Brazilian Stock Market, BOVESPA, which imposes stricter
corporate governance standards than other trading segments.159  Finally,
the company must use an independent auditor, registered with the CVM,
to conduct an annual audit of its financial statements.160  This encourages
quality of reporting of information, so the private equity vehicle and the
Brazilian capital markets (in the case of an IPO) are able to accurately
value the portfolio company.
The Brazilian Government’s decision to impose stricter corporate gov-
ernance standards on privately-held companies which receive investments
from FIPs raises various regulatory choice issues.  While the requirement
to use stringent corporate governance standards seems like a good thing, it
might lead to economic inefficiencies if the costs of compliance outweigh
the benefits.  There may be reason to believe that some growing compa-
nies should not be held the strictest of corporate governance standards
because smaller, growing companies pose fewer risks to the system and
have less money to spend on adhering to burdensome regulations.
On the other hand, if corporate governance does have important tangi-
ble benefits that the regulators feel are important, why draw the line be-
tween public companies and private companies?  Why not impose a
blanket rule that any company, that wishes to receive investment from
FIPs or other private equity vehicles, must abide by those corporate gov-
ernance standards?  Perhaps the rationale is that when a company requires
an infusion of capital it may be in bad shape and already practice poor
corporate governance.  Requiring these companies to improve their corpo-
rate governance ensures that a PE investment will be more effective.
On balance, the imposition of corporate governance standards on pri-
vately-held portfolio companies is likely a sound policy choice.  These re-
strictions, while they may impose some costs on companies that wish to
receive investments, appear to advance the goals of investor protection for
all investors, not just qualified investors.  Furthermore, requiring firms




160. Id. at 84.
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ance standards may serve as a good filter for determining which firms will
be good investments in the long-run.  By this logic, if a firm cannot meet
standards that are generally agreed to be “good” for business, then the
firm it probably not a good investment anyway.  Even though the restric-
tions on investments in privately-held portfolio companies can be seen as
paternalistic, they may also encourage a more robust, competitive
environment.
C. Stage Three: Management of the Portfolio Company
Once a private equity fund has made an investment in a target com-
pany and acquired decision-making power through a share-holder’s agree-
ment or control of the target company, it will begin to attempt to make
that company more valuable so that it can eventually sell it.  The fund may
engage in various management techniques to increase the company’s
value, including: rebranding the company, changing up the management
structure (e.g., layoffs, strategic hiring, providing better incentives for cur-
rent employees), eliminating unproductive products, investments, or activ-
ities, or adding new products.  Generally, the level of prudential oversight
during this period is very low, and because the fund is privately held it is
generally left to its own business judgment to make prudent decisions re-
garding the management of its portfolio companies.  The main regulations
that apply during this period involve general disclosure and data-reporting
to the CVM and increasingly to ANBIMA (as a self-regulating agency
among members).
A FIP is required to periodically disclose information about its finan-
cial position, including providing an audited financial statement from an
independent auditor registered with the CVM each year.161  Specifically,
the FIP must prepare annual and semi-annual financial statements, pro-
vide an opinion regarding its operations and results, disclose its net worth
and the number of quotas issued each quarter, disclose its portfolio and
the net worth of the quotas and their profitability, and any other material
facts related to the FIP.162
For funds opened in March 2011 or later that are also members of
ANBIMA or the Brazilian Association of Private Equity and Venture
Capital (ABVCAP), adherence to self-regulatory code will require that
the funds turn over additional data related to their management activi-
ties.163  In June of 2011, the ABVCAP announced plans to set up a
database of private equity and venture capital funds to comply with the
code and provide consolidated, aggregate data regarding the industry.
The data may show the total number and quantity of investments made in
161. Flesch & Silva Prado, supra note 44, at 88.
162. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 85, at 3.
163. Marcelo Loureiro, Private Equity in Numbers: ABVCap Releases Tool to Provide
PE Fund Managers With Information About Their Industry, 8 CAP. ABERTO BRAZILIAN EDI-
TION, no. 94, June 2011, http://www.capitalaberto.com/english/ler_artigo.php?pag=2&sec=
77&i=3424&btxt=private%20equity.(last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
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a given industry or the number of private equity and venture capital enti-
ties raising funds over time, but will maintain the confidentiality of individ-
ual funds and not link any one fund to particular activities.164  On March
23, 2012, ANBIMA’s Council for the Regulation and Best Practices of
Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds distributed instructions that en-
tered into effect on March 26, 2012.165  These instructions establish infor-
mation-sharing practices that private equity funds should follow when
certain events occur, such as investment or withdrawal from a company.
According to the document, after a private equity fund makes an impor-
tant decision, it should send information about the investment within 20
days to the ABVCAP database.166  This rule, by its terms, is binding on all
members of ANBIMA, subject to ANBIMA’s oversight and enforcement,
the value of which is questioned in other parts of this note.167
In general, the lack of oversight (except data-reporting) during the
management stage appears to make sense.  Since the companies in ques-
tion are privately-held, they do not pose a threat to any shareholders other
than those qualified investors that specifically chose to put their money in
them.  Basic principles of investor protection suggest that these investors
are able to protect themselves.
D. Stage Four: Exiting the Private Equity Investment
The investor’s ultimate goal in any private equity investment is to real-
ize a profit by divesting himself of his investment and selling it for more
money than he initially paid for his stake in the investment.  Usually, pri-
vate equity investors seek to exit their investment within seven to ten
years.  There are several strategies used to exit an investment.  An investor
can: (1) sell his investment to the public at large by conducting an IPO; (2)
sell his investment to another qualified investor in a private sale; (3) re-
deem his shares; or, (4) merge the company with another company.  This
section discusses only those regulations that govern IPOs and the possible
benefits and downsides of the current regulatory framework.168
As a threshold question, it is important to determine whether Brazil
has in place the right environment to allow for successful IPOs on the São
Paulo Stock Exchange.  The ability to conduct an IPO is crucial for
healthy equity markets (and the private equity industry) because it allows
164. Id.
165. See Code for the Regulation and Best Practices, supra note 28.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. The sale of investments to other qualified investors is governed by the same princi-
ples discussed in earlier parts of this note.  Redemption of shares in a private equity vehicle is
governed by the contract set out between an investor and the private equity fund in the initial
investment agreement.  For reasons beyond the scope of this note the Brazilian bureaucratic
system makes mergers extremely uncommon in Brazil.  Rather than go through the process
of combining two legal identities (it can take years to work its way through Brazil’s adminis-
trative system) companies usually prefer to simply create a new entity.
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investors to see a clear exit as a viable opportunity.  As discussed below,
Brazil has laid the regulatory and economic groundwork to allow for a
flourishing IPO market, but that market has slowed down, which is in line
with trend of decreasing IPOs worldwide after the financial crisis.
In the years before the financial crisis, the development of stable and
diversified capital markets in Brazil increased liquidity for private equity
investors and made IPOs an attractive exit alternative.169  In general, the
number of IPOs increased significantly in the years leading up to the crisis.
Numbers peaked in 2007, and decreased in the following years.  In early
2008, before the financial crisis, the MSCI Global Emerging Market Index
(which measures equity market performance in emerging markets) ranked
Brazil number one.170  Before 2008, Brazil’s IPO market was booming.
The following graph in Table 5 (based upon Ernst & Young data) illus-
trates the number of IPOs in Brazil in recent years.171
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As of November 23, 2012, only 4 IPOs had been conducted, in spite of
early media murmurs that 2012 would be a good year for IPOs.172  While
three IPOs were planned for the beginning of 2012, each fell through.173
169. Angus & Pargendler, supra note 98, at 65.
170. Id. at 66.
171. Data compiled from Ernst & Young, Global IPO Trends 2011, ERNST & YOUNG
18 (2011), http://drivkraft.ey.se/wp-content/blogs.dir/5/files/2011/06/Global_IPO_trends-
report_2011.pdf and Ernst & Young, Global IP Trends 2012, ERNST & YOUNG 19 (2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_IPO_trends_2012/$FILE/Global_IPO_
trends_2012.pdf
172. M&A, Debt Issuance Made Up for Weak Brazil IPO Market in 2012, CREDIT
SUISSE (NOV. 23, 2012), http://www.4-traders.com/news/M-A-Debt-Issuance-Made-Up-for-
Weak-Brazil-IPO-Market-in-2012-Credit-Suisse—15540112/.
173. Locamerica Cuts Price of Brazil’s First 2012 IPO, REUTERS (Apr.19, 2012), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/19/locamerica-idUSL2E8FJELT20120419.
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The first IPO of the year, Locamerca, was listed only in Spring of 2012 at
18 percent below its suggested price.  Shares for Locamerca started trading
on April 23, 2012.174  Despite early reports that suggested that the market
would pick back up in early 2012, during the first few months of the year
commentators began to realize that 2012 would not be a year of spectacu-
lar recovery.175  The problem of IPO pricing, and setting realistic list-
prices, may explain current market conditions.  According to Rob Dwyer
from EuroMoney Magazine, some bankers claim that Brazil’s IPO market
is suffering an “identity crisis.”  This is due to the fact that even though
Brazil has reached investment-grade status and relative economic matur-
ity, companies keep trying to price their shares at multiples comparable to
other emerging markets, and the discrepancy is not sustainable.176
Even though Brazil has seen a slow-down in its IPO activity since the
worldwide financial crisis, it is easy to conclude that Brazil has laid the
groundwork in terms of regulations to allow for a flourishing IPO market.
The following discusses the key regulatory improvement that has made
IPOs an attractive exit opportunity in the past, and hopefully in the future.
BOVESPA’s decision in 2000 to launch a special new listing scheme,
which allowed companies to list with three different levels of corporate
governance standards, has been widely hailed as the key regulatory devel-
opment that encouraged IPO activity in the years leading up to the crisis.
Under the Novo Mercado model, companies are allowed to list on the
BOVESPA stock exchange in three different trading segments: Level 1,
Level 2, or Novo Mercado.
The Novo Mercado model allows companies to voluntarily choose
which trading segment to list under.  Different segments require increas-
ingly more strict corporate governance standards than the baseline re-
quirements under the Brazilian Corporations Law.  To list on the segment
with the highest standards, the Novo Mercado, companies must issue only
a single class of stock (with no non-voting preferred stock) and have a
minimum of 25 percent of the corporation’s issued stock in circulation.177
Minority shareholders are granted tag-along rights that allow them to re-
ceive the same premium paid to controlling shareholders if there is a
change in control over the company.  The company must have a unified
term for all board members, and a minimum of 20 percent of the directors
on the company’s board must be “independent.”  In the case of corporate
174. Id.
175. Rogerio Jelmayer, Ernst & Young Terco Sees 20 IPOs Likely For Brazil in 2012, 4-
TRADERS (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://www.4-traders.com/SEADRILL-LIMITED-
6134373/news/Ernst-Young-Terco-Sees-20-IPOs-Likely-For-Brazil-In-2012-14027566/.
176. Rob Dwyer, Brazil’s Equities Market Suffers an Identity Crisis, EUROMONEY (Jan.
2012), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2962118/Brazils-equities-market-suffers-an-identi
ty-crisis.html.
177. Id. at 67; See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Develop-
ment Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63
STAN. L. REV. 475 (2010).
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disputes, companies must also agree to mandatory arbitration, which
reduces the uncertainty of dealing with the Brazilian judicial system.  If
the company opts out of the Novo Mercado segment or delists, there is a
mandatory bid for all shares in circulation.  This ostensibly prevents arbi-
trage that would allow a company to list on the Novo Mercado for the sake
of the trading premium associated with stronger corporate governance,
only to delist after realizing the value.
Brazil’s Novo Mercado model has been generally heralded as a positive
regulatory development that has effectively helped to improve corporate
governance.178  Data suggests that the Novo Mercado model has also been
extremely popular. Of the 64 companies listing on BOVESPA in 2007,
over two thirds chose to list their shares on the Novo Mercado.179  Ac-
cording to Gilson, Brazil’s use of the Novo Mercado has allowed the coun-
try to overcome what he calls the “Olson Problem” (named after Mancur
Olson).180  This phenomenon explains that in developing countries like
Brazil the entrenched economic elite wield significant political clout and
have incentives to combat any government-led efforts towards improve-
ments in corporate governance which might improve the country’s
macroeconomic climate overall but undermine their tight grip on eco-
nomic power.181  Gilson argues that Brazil prior to the implementation of
the Novo Mercado model in 2000 was a paradigmatic example of a country
suffering from the Olson problem, where entrenched economic interests
had little incentive to impose stricter corporate governance standards, dis-
couraging investment overall but maximizing the elites’ own interests.182
He contends that the Novo Mercado is a form of “regulatory dualism”
which can combat the Olson problem by allowing elites to remain gov-
erned by the previous regulatory regime, while allowing newcomers to
choose to adhere to stricter regulations, on a voluntary basis.183  This, he
argues, can be more politically tenable than massive regulatory overhaul,
which will likely face fierce opposition from those content with the status
quo.184
The Novo Mercado model may be criticized on the grounds that if cor-
porate governance is truly important goal essential for healthy markets,
then it should be a strict requirement imposed on every company seeking
to list on a Brazilian stock exchange.  As Gilson, points out, however,
these kinds of sweeping changes can be cumbersome to enact and often
fail, leaving countries with less corporate governance than if they had just
let companies pick and choose their level of governance.  In the context of
private equity, the Brazilian Government has laudably taken a harder
178. Angus & Pargendler, supra note 98, at 67.
179. Id. at 68.
180. Gilson et al., supra note 177, at 494.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 482.
183. Id. at 478.
184. Id.
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stance on corporate governance, by requiring any privately-held company
that receive investments from a FIP to list on the Novo Mercado, as in the
case of an IPO.  For reasons discussed in Section III, this appears to be a
very prudent policy.  The Novo Mercado model strikes a good balance be-
tween the goals of encouraging good corporate governance and effectuat-
ing reform in a way that combats the Olson problem.  By allowing
companies to choose to subject themselves to higher standards of corpo-
rate governance, it allows those companies to reap the rewards from those
investors that are eager to invest in companies, which they believe have
better business practices.  The model proves to be effective in encouraging
activity on the Brazilian stock exchange, while also improving the quality
of companies listing, and promoting healthy, flourishing equity markets.
However, because the Brazilian stock markets have changed significantly
since 2000 (having experienced a string of IPOs in the lead up to the finan-
cial crisis and achieved investment grade status in 2008), Brazilian regula-
tors should ask whether or not the Novo Mercado listing scheme is still the
most effective way of encouraging companies to list on BOVESPA.  Con-
sidering the stagnation in the number of IPOs since 2008, it may be time to
implement more aggressive policies that encourage new listings.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
In Part II of this note, I demonstrated that the Brazilian private equity
market has experienced a period of massive growth over the past ten years
and appears poised to grow even more in the future.  Key to this increased
private equity activity was Brazil’s ability to promote macroeconomic sta-
bility by reigning in inflation, the government’s overt encouragement of
private equity funds through the creation of the FIP investment form, the
reduction in capital gains taxes associated with private equity investments,
and the changes in regulatory policies that allowed Brazilian pension funds
to invest directly in private equity investment vehicles.  I showed that the
main regulators of the private equity industry in Brazil are the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “CVM”) and the self-regula-
tory ANBIMA Association and BOVESPA São Paulo Stock exchange.  In
general, I demonstrated that Brazil has taken a relatively “hands off” ap-
proach to private equity regulation, as evidenced by the CVM’s minimal
registration requirements and reluctance to scrutinize private equity activ-
ity until that activity touches the capital markets.
In Part III of this note, I analyzed the regulations governing a private
equity investment vehicle throughout the lifetime of that investment.  I
found that the Brazilian Government has successfully encouraged invest-
ment in private equity vehicles by allowing vehicles to organize as a lim-
ited partnership under the laws of another country (typically under the
laws of Delaware in the United States), and by creating a special type of
private equity investment vehicle, the FIP, with tax benefits substantially
similar to the limited partnership form enjoyed in the United States.  I
found that while the Brazilian Government has very successfully en-
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couraged private equity investment through FIPs and more targeted infra-
structure and real estate funds, its investment vehicle dedicated to
encouraging venture capital investments, the FMIEE, has been less suc-
cessful.  Given the importance of venture capital to market dynamism and
prosperity, I recommended that Brazil reassess the incentives it provides
to the FMIEE fund structure.  I found that Brazil has effectuated the nec-
essary investor protections to encourage investment in portfolio compa-
nies, but that investors have needed to rely on arbitration as opposed to
the Brazilian court system to enforce their rights.  Accordingly, I recom-
mend that Brazil improve its legal system’s efficiency and predictability to
encourage more investment.  I showed that regulations related to manage-
ment of the private equity investment are sparse and limited to the re-
quirement to disclose information related to the companies’ financial
position, which is a good thing insofar as Brazil insists on high standards of
accounting.  Lastly, I found that Brazil has laid the regulatory groundwork
to encourage viable exit opportunities by allowing companies to pick and
choose their ideal level of corporate governance using the São Paulo Stock
Exchange’s Novo Mercado model.
In my subsequent note, published in this Journal’s next issue, I will
critique the regulatory choices Brazil has made in regulating its private
equity industry as described in this note, and provide suggestions for fur-
ther improvement.
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